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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is another in the continuing succession of discordant neighbors battling 
over whatever issues provide a cause. Who is actually at fault is a matter of some 
dispute, with Appellee Defendant Randall (Randall) claiming that Appellant Plaintiff 
Leon "Lumpy" White (White) trespassed on Randall's land, stole the water in Randall's 
pond, and allowed his dogs to run free and kill Randall's chickens and a foal (baby 
horse), and ultimately White's son allegedly shot at Randall and Randall threatened to 
"return fire." White's position, as you may guess, is somewhat different. 
This case is really about Appellant White seeking water to which he has no right. 
This case is not about Appellant obtaining an appropriate easement for the delivery of his 
irrigation water, for the trial Court already resolved that issue by awarding White an 
easement over and across Randall's land. Plaintiff primarily seeks an "easement" 
consisting of a large pond on Randall's property to impound water in excess of White's 
recognized water rights, and then to use that water to supplement his irrigation rights and 
to flood irrigate his swampy pasture. No such water right has ever existed on this 
property, the irrigation company claims no right to impound or store water on Randall's 
land, and White has no water rights registered with the State Engineer allowing him to 
impound or store water. No express easements appear of record. 
While Appellee Randall does not completely agree with the Trial Court, the ruling 
and judgment is reasonable and should be affirmed. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Was it proper for the trial court to reference certain maps that it located 
through its own computer mapping software and that corresponded to and were consistent 
with maps and legal descriptions of the property already submitted to the court? 
2. Did the trial court properly order that White has an implied easement in a 
ditch to be constructed in the place of the unauthorized pond on Randall's property where 
White only had rights to a limited amount of irrigation water and no right to store it in 
Randall's pond? 
3. Was the trial court correct in ordering the parties to pay their own attorney's 
fees and costs and in awarding no punitive damages where no tort was established and no 
compensatory damages were ordered? 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Leon J. "Lumpy" White filed this lawsuit against Jerry Randall on August 29, 
2003 (R. at 1). He requested that Randall restore the ditch and pond on Randall's 
property to their "prior condition," though no specifications were ever provided as to 
what exact "prior condition" White was referring (R. at 1-3). White also asked for an 
award of attorney's fees and punitive damages (R. at 3). 
The trial began on October 9, 2003 and ended on November 26, 2003 (R. at 35, 
41-46). Following closing argument, the trial Court made certain findings of fact, 
including a finding that Randall's chickens valued at $198.00 were killed by White's dogs 
(R. at 270, pp. 534, 535), and that "It's more likely than not that the horse (Randall's foal) 
was killed by the actions of the dog. The problem is that I don't have a value I can rely 
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on. . . . So I'm not going to award any damages for the loss of the horse." (R. at 270, pp. 
534 - 535). (See Addendum Exhibit 1) 
The trial court also requested that counsel each prepare and submit Proposed 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, along with an 8 l/2" x 11" map or scaled 
drawing of the property (R. 45). The Court set a deadline and Ordered a simultaneous 
exchange of the pleadings. 
Counsel for White submitted two requests for extensions of time to file the 
proposed findings of fact. After granting the first Motion for Extension, the trial court 
denied the second extension (R. 81). Counsel for Randall filed his Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law with two scaled diagrams and a map on the deadline, 
February 27, 2004. Counsel for Randall also sent White's counsel a copy of the pleading 
on the same day (R. 82). Counsel for Randall filed his Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, along with a "poster-size" (as opposed to an 8 V? X 11" as 
requested by the Court) scaled aerial photograph seven days later on March 5, 2004 (R. 
82). 
Randall filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Proposed Finding of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law due to White's violations of the Court ordered deadline. Despite 
White's untimely filing and disregard of the court's orders, on or about September 3, 
2004 the trial Court sent a letter to counsel, apologizing for the delay and stating that 
"Apparently we allowed the file to become lost." The Court had signed White's proposed 
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findings and directed White's counsel to prepare an appropriate Judgment.1 (See: 
Exhibit 2 to Addendum). 
The trial court signed and entered the judgment on September 22, 2004. On 
September 28, 2004, in anticipation of a possible appeal, and to give the Trial Court an 
opportunity to correct its legal errors,2 Randall filed a Notice of Objection to Judgment 
and a Motion to Alter, Amend or Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on the grounds that the findings adopted by the court were inconsistent with prior findings 
made by the court following trial (R. 117-120).3 
On April 4, 2005, the court held a further motion hearing at which time it 
conducted oral argument and requested additional documents (R. 229-231, 273). The 
Court granted Randall's motion subject to a review and the entry of new findings and 
conclusions. The trial court filed its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on July 26, 2005, and Judgment was filed on September 19, 2005 (R. 238-247, 254-256). 
The trial court held that White is entitled to an easement across Randall's land. 
The easement is to be "exactly equal in both length and width to the existing ditch which 
conveyed water both to and from the now non-existent pond." The ditch will be 
1
 The court was likely unaware of the procedural errors made by White, and was 
possibly unaware of Appellee Randall's filing altogether, as a result of the lost file. (See 
Court's letter September 3, 2004; not indexed as part of record). 
2
 "This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows 
for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 
966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). 
3
 White now asks this Court to reinstate the prior Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment (Exhibit 3), Randall attaches his motion and memorandum hereto as 
exhibit 4, and incorporates the arguments herein by this reference. 
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connected in the space where the pond once existed, and the easement provides White the 
right to trespass on Randall's land for the purpose of maintaining the ditch and controlling 
the flow of water. No water rights were included in the decision, and the parties were 
ordered to pay their own attorney's fees and costs. White filed a Notice of Appeal on 
October 14, 2005 (R. 262). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On June 3, 1988, Kaziah May Jordan Hancock ("Hancock") and her 
husband purchased approximately 40 acres of land in Indianola, Utah, from Kent Spencer 
and 28 adjoining acres from Clyde Condley. (Exhibit #17). Hancock also purchased six 
(6) shares of stock in the Indianola Irrigation Company from Kent Spencer and 28 shares 
of stock in the Indianola Irrigation Company from Clyde Condley (R. at 269, pp. 81-82). 
2. On July 28, 1995, Hancock sold 16 acres of her land to Leon J. White, 
along with an existing well and one share of stock in the Indianola Irrigation Company 
(R. at 269, pp. 6-9; Exhibit #2). Later on that year, White bought approximately 9-10 
acres of adjoining property from Hancock. On March 2, 1996, White bought ten (10) 
additional shares of stock in the Indianola Irrigation Company from Hancock (R. at 269, 
p. 9; Exhibit 15). 
3. In 1996, Hancock sold a final adjoining parcel of 11 Vi acres of land to Jerry 
Randall (R. at 269, p. 19; Exhibit #16). Randall had water rights to a well on the 
property, but did not purchase any shares of stock in the Indianola Irrigation Company (R. 
at 270, p. 361). Randall's property was the eastern-most parcel of the three contiguous 
properties conveyed by Hancock. A pond of indeterminate size was located on the land 
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sold to Randall (R. at 269, p. 100). See exhibit 5 to this brief for a plat of the properties 
(Exhibit #1 at Trial). 
THE HISTORY OF THE "POND" 
4. The history of the pond on Randall's property was as a stock watering pond. 
(R. at 269, p. 179, line 10 -11; R.269, p. 215, line2 - 4), but in 1983 the pond was 
obliterated by flooding (See Exhibit #6 to the Addendum, photo of dam bursting). In or 
about 1985, Don Tibbs, Kent Spencer's lessee, rebuilt and expanded the pond, installed a 
head gate and a valve to allow the connection of a pump (R. at 269, pp. 179-180), and 
then pumped water off the property to other properties he was farming north of the 
highway (R. at 269, p. 17, line 11 - 13). Tibbs never used the pond for flood irrigation of 
the property now owned by White, nor did he flood irrigate any other property from the 
pond (R.269, p. 219, line 20 - 22). Tibbs' lease on the property expired when Spencer 
sold the 38-acres to Hancock in 1988. 
5. From 1988 to 1995, Hancock used the pond to transport water to her land 
(R. at 270 pp. 447-448). The water would remain in the pond until the pond's valve was 
opened and water flowed through the ditch to the property to the west (what is now 
White's property) (R. at 269, p. 10). 
6. The Indianola Irrigation Company transported water through an existing 
ditch that led down to the pond (R. at 269, p. 10-11). The irrigation ditch emptied 
irrigation water into the pond. Another ditch had developed where the "head gate" exited 
the dam, allowing water to exit the pond. The ditch was initially used to water two trees 
on the White's property: after Tibbs constructed the pond and ditch. However, Tibbs 
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never used the pond to impound or distribute water for flood irrigation (R. at 269, pp. 
163-165, 173). The pond stored and discharged water originating from both the irrigation 
ditch and from multiple springs and seeps (R. at 269, p. 10; 270 p. 361). Some of the 
spring water originated on Randall's property, but most of the spring runoff came from 
springs on Mrs. Terry's land to the east of Randall's land (R. at 270 pp. 361, 368). 
7. When he purchased his parcel of land in 1996, Randall walked the property 
and noticed a ditch from the pond to the White property (R. at 270, pp. 366-367). 
Hancock made no mention to Randall of White's rights to any of the water in the pond 
(R. at 270, p. 294). From his conversations with Hancock regarding the rights to the 
water in the pond, Randall believed that he could use some of the pond water to "sprinkle 
and water around the area" because the water in the pond accrued there from springs and 
from runoff from the property (R. at 270, p. 294). He was also told by Mrs. Terry, from 
whose land the spring water flowed into the pond, that he could use the spring water (R. 
at 270, p. 368). 
THE POND PROBLEM 
8. Sometime around 1998, after White moved to the property and after 
Randall had purchased his property, White asked Randall to help him dig a ditch to 
deliver his irrigation water, Randall took his tractor "and put forth the effort to help him 
do so; but I never did see water come through the ditch down into the pond. (Transcript 
p. 297, line 14 - 23). Shortly thereafter, and in 1998, Appellant White used the Pond to 
irrigate his property, lowering its level but leaving some water R. at 270, p. 296, 16 - 19). 
Each and every year, following the 1998 incident, White would enter upon Randall's 
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property during irrigation season and drain the pond and leave it dry. (R. at 270, p. 300, 
line 6 - 11). White made no attempt to use the same amount of water he put into the 
pond. (R. at 269, p. 65, line 9-21). 
9. One such year in which White drained the pond was 2002, a year in which 
White had leased his water rights to another person (R. at 269, p. 243 line 22 - 25, R. at 
270, p. 300 line 9 - 25). White continued to go onto Randall's land from 1998-2003 to 
open the valves to the pond so he could flood irrigate his land, despite being told by 
Randall that he was taking water without any right to do so (R. at 270, pp. 299-301). 
10. To preserve his right to use the spring water in the pond and to prevent 
White from continuing to drain his pond, Randall constructed a ditch on the edge of his 
property to transport water to the White property (R. at 270, p. 302). The new ditch was 
located on the site where Randall believed a historical easement previously existed, and 
connected to the ditch providing the irrigation water to the pond (R. at 270, pp. 302, 306). 
Randall also put a chain and padlock on the valves of the pond to keep White from taking 
water to which he had no right (R. at 270, pp. 367-368). However, White refused to use 
the newly constructed ditch and trespassed onto Randall's property, diverted the 
irrigation, cut off and disposed of the chain and padlock, opened the valve and again 
drained the pond (R. at 270, pp. 343-344). This was a year of severe drought and all 
water in the valley had been preserved solely for stock watering purposes. 
11. Further evidence of White's desire to expand his water rights comes from 
John Bigler, water master of the Indianola Irrigation Co., who testified that White's water 
right was at most, 15 minutes per share (11 shares) every 10 days during irrigation 
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season. (P. 231, line 11 - 12). Irrigation season varies, but begins when the farmers get 
greedy, generally about July 1, and water is in short supply. (R. at 269, p. 231, line 1-3). 
In 2003, due to a shortage of water, irrigation was terminated on July 1 and water was 
only allowed for stock watering. However, Appellant testified that when the pond was 
full, it would provide him with a four (4) day continuous flow of water to his land. (R. at 
269, p. 11, line 23-25). In 2003, when irrigation was terminated on July 1, Lumpy White 
testified that he had four continuous days of irrigation from the pond (R. at 269, p. 66, 
line 6 - 10, Id. p. 16, line 22 - 23). 
12. In an attempt to determine the historic path of the water used to irrigate 
White's land, and to determine any rights to the water in the pond for his own use since 
the pond accumulated water from the ditch, from springs, and from seeps, Randall 
checked with the Division of Water Sources in Salt Lake to check the records regarding 
the pond (R. at 270, p. 301). He learned that the Indianola Water Irrigation Company had 
no storage rights, water rights, or easements of any sort on his property (R. at 270, pp. 
301-302; R. at 269, p. 252; See also Addendum exhibit # 7). The Indianola Irrigation 
Company has a separate holding pond in which it stores water. Because the State law 
does not permit the Indianola Irrigation Company to store water, the holding pond must 
be able to drain within 24 hours (R. at 269, pp. 232-233). 
13. Randall caused the pond to be removed in July 2003 after being informed 
by the state water engineer that he had no right to water storage on his property, either for 
himself or for any other individual (R. 26). 
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14. While White and the immediate predecessor to his property, Hancock, used 
the pond to impound and provide water to their fields, the pond was not essential for their 
full use and enjoyment of those water rights because they could have tapped into the 
pressurized irrigation system to obtain water (R. at 270, p.427), or used historic 
easements. In fact, only two stockholders of Indianola Irrigation Company who own 
property in Indianola are not on the pressure irrigation system (R. 237), and Appellant 
White is one of the two. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This court should affirm the trial court's decision granting White an easement 
across Randall's land in the form of a ditch reasonably connected in the space where the 
pond once was that is equal in length and width to the existing ditch which conveyed 
water both to and from the now non-existent pond (R. at 246-247). The easement 
includes White's right to "trespass on Mr. Randall's land for reasonable ditch 
maintenance and for controlling the flow of water" (R. at 247). 
The easement ordered by the trial court should be upheld because: 1) the trial 
court's referencing of USGS maps did not go outside the evidence presented at trial 
because the maps were based on maps and legal descriptions of property submitted to the 
court during trial; 2) White failed to object to the use of the maps when they were 
presented to counsel on April 4, 2005 and thus waived his right to bring the issue up on 
appeal; 3) the trial court may take judicial notice of the maps as an adjudicative fact 
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned"; 4) the ditch to be constructed is the least burdensome and 
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most reasonable easement required under the circumstances; and 5) the reconstruction of 
the pond would promote unlawful storage of water, as neither Randall, White, Spencer 
nor Hancock ever owned any rights to divert or store water. 
White has failed to marshal the evidence necessary to refute the findings of fact 
made by the trial Court regarding damages for his dogs killing Randall's chickens. 
This court should also uphold the order that the parties pay their own attorney's 
fees (R. 247) by finding that: 1) Utah courts do not award attorney's fees unless they are 
expressly provided for by statute or contract; and 2) punitive damages may not be granted 
in this case because the conduct was not tortious, reprehensible, and did not willfully and 
maliciously violate the right of another. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING MUST BE UPHELD BECAUSE THE USE 
OF U.S. GEOLOGIC SURVEY MAPS WERE PROPER AND DID NOT 
VIOLATE ANY RULE OF LAW 
The trial court did not error in referencing certain U.S. Geologic Survey maps in 
its findings of fact because: 1) the maps included only information already presented to 
the court at trial; 2) White waived its right to raise this issue on appeal by failing to object 
to the maps when they were presented by the trail court during a motion hearing; and 3) 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of the maps. 
Furthermore, even if the trial court did error in referencing the maps, it was harmless 
error because the findings of fact were inferable from other evidence presented at trial and 
the evidence demands the same judgment. 
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Whether the maps used in the trial court's findings of fact included only 
information already presented to the court at trial is a question of fact to be reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard. See State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1994). 
The issues of whether the court may use and take judicial notice of maps it located on its 
own and whether White waived his right to raise this issue on appeal are questions of law 
to be reviewed for correctness. See Savage v. Educators Ins, Co,, 908 P.2d 862, 864-865 
(Utah 1995). 
i. The trial court did not go outside of the evidence presented at trial to make a 
finding of fact because the U.S. Geologic Survey maps were assembled by 
using maps submitted by counsel and legal descriptions of the property 
presented as evidence at trial 
On appeal, White contends that the trial court based its ruling on independent 
research and facts not in evidence, thereby constituting legal error. The trial court used a 
map computer program to construct comprehensive, easy-to-read maps of the property in 
question. These maps simply re-depicted those maps and legal descriptions of the 
property already submitted into evidence and thus did not constitute facts not submitted 
into evidence. During trial, both White and Randall submitted to the court various maps, 
accounts of the geographical features, and legal descriptions of the property in question. 
Defendant's Exhibit 1 is a plat map of the property and contains numerous map 
coordinates as well as an outline of the property owned by White and 
Randall—comparable to some of the maps in the trial court's findings of fact. 
Defendant's Exhibits 2, 3, 9, 16 were all admitted into evidence at trial and all set forth 
the legal description or geographical location of the property involved. 
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Further, at the trial court's request, Randall submitted a map with his Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that contains all of the contour lines, locations 
of water sources, and coordinates used by and highlighted on the maps presented by the 
trial court. Randall also submitted two scaled diagrams depicting the relative location of 
the parcels. 
The trial court used the maps submitted to the trial court along with evidence 
containing legal descriptions of the property to construct a cohesive picture of the 
geographical features of the property in question (R. 273, pp. 9-10). The maps contain no 
information or depiction not previously presented to the court and seen by both parties. 
The trial court even explained to those present at the motion hearing a step-by-step 
account of how he constructed the maps used in his findings of fact (R. 273, pp. 9-13). 
The Court invited the attorneys to object and neither did. 
In Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Company, 503 P.2d 850 (Utah 1972), 
Salt Lake City brought suit to quiet title to the flow of water from a tunnel constructed by 
the defendant, which the city argued reduced the flow of a creek. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision because the judge used a book not in 
evidence to produce nine exhibits for his consideration which were never seen by counsel 
at trial. Id. at 852. In addition, the judge used a "proper slope" as derived by a student 
using a computer at the University of Utah which was "at variance with that used by the 
City in calculating the base line of a double mass curve used to compare variance in 
comparative stream flows." Id. The court further explained that because "[t]he computer 
gave the judge a slope not in accord with the evidence given by the experts; yet he used 
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this slope to decide that the exhibits of the City were in error. . . " the trial court went 
outside the evidence in making its finding. Id 
In Salt Lake City v. United City Mines Company\ the trial court's exhibits and 
outside calculations of the proper slope directly contradicted the evidence submitted at 
trial. Such was not the case here. The trial court's use of computer-generated maps did 
not contradict any expert testimony given at trial. When White testified that the ditch and 
the pond was the only way the water could get to White's property, he explained that 
"[tjhere's a highway on one side of us; and we're a little higher than the rest of the land. 
So that would be the only way we could get [the water]" (R. at 269, p. 17). White's 
testimony corresponds with the trial court's findings of fact and provides a basis for the 
trial court's findings that "[t]he only way water can possibly flow from the pond onto the 
NE corner of White's property is for it [to] flow below the 5,940 contour line and above 
the 5,920 contour line," and that "[i]t should be physically and geographically possible 
for water to flow across Mr. Randall's property and onto Mr. White's property" (R. 238-
246). 
Furthermore, though both White and Hancock testified that the only means by 
which water could get to White's land was through the ditch and the pond, they were 
indisputably limiting the scope of the opinions to means of water delivery to "right 
now"—given the current conditions of the propeity and not taking into consideration 
alternative methods (R. 260, 17; R. at 270, p. 428). On cross-examination, White himself 
acknowledged that taking water from Randall's pond was not the only way he could get 
water to his propeity, for at the very least, he could have connected into the pressurized 
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system to obtain his water (R. at 270, pp. 427-28). Additionally, Kent Spencer testified 
that when he owned the property, he used a different canal, called the "meetinghouse 
wash,55 to flood irrigate the land (R. at 269, p. 161). Thus, the trial court's use of the 
maps published by the U.S. Geologic Survey did not conflict with any established facts 
presented during trial. 
The trial court complied with the rule that "the findings of all triers of fact, either 
court or jury, must be based upon testimony of witnesses or other evidence made apart of 
the record...:' Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Company, 503 P.2d 850, 852 
(Utah 1972) (emphasis added). The maps included in the trial court's decision reflect the 
descriptions of the properly as presented by the witnesses and as established by the maps 
and trust deeds presented by the parties at trial. The trial court used a computer program 
to synthesize an easy-to-read map of the area—an inference it was capable of making on 
its own as a result of the maps and property descriptions already submitted to the court. 
iu In failing to object to the trial court's use of the maps during a motion 
hearing, White waived his right to appeal the use of such maps 
Counsel for both White and Randall were shown the U.S. Geologic Survey maps 
during a motion hearing held on April 4, 2005. At that hearing, the court showed the 
parties the topographic maps referred to in its final finding of fact (R. 273, pp. 4-6). In 
doing so, the judge "invite[d] [counsel] to challenge me on what Fve done, because if 
Fve made mistakes. I don't want them to be the basis for a decision in this case. So if 
that quit claim deed is something that's in your evidence, and I've got the wrong point of 
beginning, or if I've done something wrong with the meets and bounds description, then I 
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want to know about i f (R. 273, p. 10). The judge talked to the parties in detail about the 
maps he presented at that hearing (and later used in his opinion), and at no time did 
counsel for White make any objection (R. 273, pp. 3-18). In direct contrast, counsel for 
White did object later on during the hearing to the trial court's asking Randall to explain 
the "meetinghouse wash" (R. 273, p. 32). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that for an issue to be raised on appeal, a party 
must make a timely objection to the claimed error: 
We noted in State v. Hoi gate that, "[a]s a general rule, claims not raised 
before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 
P.3d 346. We held further "that the preservation rule applies to every 
claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances1 exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." Id at 350. In State v. Emrnett, 839 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Utah 
1992), we wrote that "our case law establishes that the doctrine of waiver 
has application if defendants fail to raise claims at the appropriate time at 
the trial level, so the judge has an opportunity to rule on the issue." Other 
cases note that in order to preserve a claim or an objection for appellate 
review, the defendant must raise a timely or contemporaneous claim or 
objection. See State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1226-27 (Utah 1989) 
(explaining that issue not properly preserved for appeal where defense 
fails to make objection to remarks at t r ia l ) . . . . 
State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230, 232 (Utah 2002). 
The Utah Supreme Court then went on to explain the policy considerations behind 
requiring a contemporaneous objection to preserve a claimed error for appeal: 
The two policy reasons for the preservation rule are, first, to give the trial 
court an opportunity to "address the claimed error, and if appropriate, 
correct it," and second, that "a defendant should not be permitted to 
forego making an objection with the strategy of enhanc[ing] the 
defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, ... 
claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." As we said in State v. 
Brown, "defendants are thus not entitled to both the benefit of not 
objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal. 
16 
State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230, 233 (Utah 2002), citing Holgate, 10 P.3d 346 
(Utah 2000) and State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). 
In failing to object to the use of the maps presented by the trial court during the 
motion hearing, White waived his right to raise the issue on appeal. Despite being 
prompted by the trial court to challenge the maps if he was making an error or mistake, 
White did not voice any objection to the maps at any point during the hearing. It was not 
until the trial court made its ruling with which White was not satisfied that any claim of 
error was made regarding the trial court's use of the maps. 
iiu The court may take judicial notice of the maps published by the United States 
Geologic Survey used by the trial court 
White wrongly argues that the trial court cannot "go outside of the evidence 
presented at trial to make a finding" (A.B. at 13). Utah has adopted Federal Rule of 
Evidence 201, which states that a court can take judicial notice of adjudicative facts, 
whether requested or not, that are either "(1) generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned" Utah R. Evid. § 201(b)-
(c)(emphasis added). 
In alleging that the trial court improperly referred to certain maps published by 
United States Geologic Survey in making its findings of fact, White has not challenged 
the accuracy of the maps or the validity of the source. Furthermore, several Utah courts 
have taken judicial notice of geographic facts. (See e.g., State v. Bailey, 3 Utah 2d. 254, 
255 (1955) (taking judicial notice that Panguitch is located in Garfield county); Esnernia 
v. Overland Moving Co., 115 Utah 519, 523 (1949) (taking judicial notice of the towns 
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between Elko, Nevada and point of accident.)) In U.S. v. Burch, the court noted that 
"official government maps are generally an acceptable source for taking judicial notice." 
169 F.3d 666 (D. Colo. 1999). 
Courts in other states adopting similar language as is in section 201(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence have taken judicial notice of maps and surveys: Judicial notice 
of a survey map was taken in Florida {Graves v. Florida, 587 So.2d 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991)) and California has taken judicial notice of a current system of surveys in the 
state, government surveys of public lands, and official maps. South Shore Land Co. v. 
Petersen, 226 Cal. App. 2d 725, 745 (Cal. App. 1964). Thus the trial court was within its 
discretion to take judicial notice of the United States Geologic Survey maps as "sources 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Utah R. Evid. § 201(b). 
The court need not wait for a party to introduce a fact into evidence before it can 
take judicial notice of that fact. "Except for those matters of which the court may take 
judicial notice, the deliberations of the trial judge are limited to the record made before 
him or her . . . ." 89 C.J.S. Trial § 1018 (2005) (emphasis added). The U.S. Supreme 
Court has upheld this principle in New Mexico v. Texas by affirming the special master's 
finding that "the Salazar-Diaz Survey was corroborated by certain of the maps of the 
surveys made for the Joint Boundary Commissions and the War Department. . . and that 
all these maps—as well as certain other maps that had not been introduced into evidence, 
but of which he thought judicial notice might be taken—sustained the contention of Texas 
as to the course of the Rio Grande in 1850 . . . ." New Mexico v. Texas, 275 U.S. 279, 
298 (1928)(emphasis added). Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's 
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taking judicial notice sua sponte of a prior Supreme Court decision that was neither 
admitted into evidence nor formally brought to the attention of either counsel. Ringwood 
v. Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah App. 1990). 
The trial court was also well within its discretion to take judicial notice of the 
maps dining a motion hearing following the actual trial because "{jjudicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceeding/' Utah R. Evid. 201(f). The court's presentation of 
the maps during the hearing also gave both parties the opportunity to be heard as to the 
"propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed" as required section 
(e) of the rule. 
iv. Even if the trial court did error by referencing maps, use of such extrinsic 
evidence is not ipso facto reversible error 
Even if it were determined that the trial court erred by referencing the U.S. 
Geologic Survey maps in its findings of fact, such error is harmless and does not 
constitute reversible error. In his dissent in Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Co., 
Justice Henriod argued that "[u]se of such extrinsic evidence by the trial court may be 
error of some sort but is not ipso facto reversible error. . . even erroneous findings ipso 
facto would not constitute such error." 503 P.2d 850, 853 (Henriod, J., dissenting). He 
further explained, "[s]uch extra curriculum research should be ignored, if, but for such 
work, the evidence demands the same judgment." Id. 
Though Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Co. is clearly distinguishable 
from this case in that the trial court there used outside information that was never seen by 
counsel to come up with evidence contrary to that which was produced at trial (whereas 
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here, counsel did see the maps prior to the trial court's findings, and the maps simply re-
depicted those maps and property descriptions produced during trial), Justice Henriod's 
point is nonetheless valid and applicable to the present circumstances. 
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that a court's legal error in admitting 
certain evidence is not necessarily reversible error, where "other evidence was sufficient 
to establish [what the improper evidence declared]; the purpose, character, and extent of 
the combination are inferable from [the other evidence] alone." U.S. v. Crescent 
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 184 (1944). The Court went on to explain that "even if 
error be assumed in the introduction of the letters and reports, the burden of showing 
prejudice has not been sustained." Id 
White has not been prejudiced by the trial court's use of the U.S. Geologic Survey 
maps because the evidence presented by the parties is capable of establishing those things 
which are referenced in the U.S. Geologic Survey maps: the location of the various 
properties, the contour lines, and the approximate location of the pond. Thus the evidence 
demands the same judgment, regardless of any error that may have occurred. 
Accordingly, the appellate court should uphold the district court's ruling and find 
that the implied easement granted to White shall be a ditch reasonably connecting the 
irrigation ditch to the ditch previously used to transport the pond water to White's land. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED THAT A WATER 
DELIVERY SYSTEM BE CONSTRUCTED THAT DOES NOT INCLUDE 
A POND IN WHICH TO STORE AND IMPOUND WATER 
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In finding an easement by implication, a court is not restricted to limiting that 
easement to the "historical" pathway, especially where to do so would be to create an 
unnecessary and unreasonable burden on the servient landowner. Thus, the trial court 
correctly ruled that the appropriate scope of the implied easement in favor of White is a 
ditch used for the transportation of irrigation water across Randall's land. 
The trial court's finding of fact that a ditch would provide a workable route by 
which to bring water to White's property is a question of fact that should not be set aside 
unless found to be clearly erroneous. See State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1993). 
Whether the trial court may order an implied easement in favor of White that does not 
include Randall's pond is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
i. Utah law permits the trial court, in finding an implied easement, to construct 
an alternative route by which to bring water to White's land 
On appeal, White contests the form of the easement granted to White by the trial 
court. In addition to arguing that the trial court relied on its independent research to 
construct an alternate water delivery system, White contends that "[i]f White was entitled 
to an easement by implication pursuant to Adamson v. Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264 (Utah 
1947), then the trial court should have granted White an easement in the entire water 
delivery system as it existed historically" (A.B. 13). However, a close reading of 
Adamson v. Brockbank would indicate that a court may grant an implied easement in a 
different route than previously used by the owner of the easement. 
In Adamson v. Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264 (Utah, 1947), property known as 
"Chipman Farm" was divided and sold to Adamson and Brockbank. For over 30 years an 
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irrigation ditch crossed the portion of the farm sold to Brockbank and was used to irrigate 
certain portions of the farm sold to Adamson, but the deeds made no mention of a right of 
way or easement. Id. at 269. Brockbank destroyed the ditch while constructing homes on 
his property, thereby preventing Adamson from bringing water through the ditch to their 
property. Id. After considering multiple factors in determining whether the 
circumstances of the conveyance of the land implied an easement, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that Adamson had an easement by implication. Id. at 274. 
In weighing the various factors and finding an implied easement, the court did not 
discount the possibility of crafting a new ditch over a different course. Rather, the court 
noted that this particular ditch, rather than a different route, constituted an implied 
easement because "the evidence supports the [trial] court's finding that it was not feasible 
to bring water to the land over a course different from the one already existing at the time 
of purchase." Id. at 271. The Court further stated, u[i]f an alternate way permits a 
grantee to make use of his land at little or no cost, the availability of this means might be 
a factor in determining the necessity of the easement." Id. at 274. Thus it follows that the 
court is not limited to preserving the historical water delivery system in granting an 
easement by implication. 
iu In Utah, the court must limit an easement to the most reasonable and least 
burdensome easement that is required under the circumstances 
The trial court properly ordered that the easement granted to White be the size of 
the existing ditch which conveyed water to and from the now non-existent pond, and that 
it be reasonably connected in the space where the pond was located. Utah law suggests 
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that the dominant owner's (White's) right to use an implied easement should not 
unreasonable or go beyond what is necessary for the puiposes for which it was granted. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated the following: 
Utah law provides that the rights of the dominant owner of an easement 
are impliedly limited by the rights of the servient owner. Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah 1946). "The use of 
an easement must be as reasonable and as little burdensome to the servient 
estate as the nature of the easement and its puipose will permit." Id. 
quoting Jenkins v. Depoyster, 186 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Ky 1945). 
Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 
1990), 
White argues that the alternative water delivery system ordered by the court 
deprives him of his right to "use and enjoy the historical water delivery system" (A.B. 
21). However, testimony presented at trial showed not only that the pond was not 
historically used to deliver irrigation water to the property now owned by White, but that 
neither White nor Randall had the right to impound irrigation water in the pond (R. 273, 
p. 73). 
White's water shares only entitled him to irrigation water flowing from the 
irrigation ditch into the pond: he has never had any rights to the spring water comprising 
much of the water in the pond. Thus, the purpose of the implied easement is to allow 
White to access the irrigation ditch that previously delivered irrigation water into the 
pond. The ditch ordered by the court adequately fulfils the easement's purpose and does 
not impose on Randall, the servient owner, the unreasonable burden of reconstructing a 
pond of undetermined size and composition, maintaining and servicing the pond, and 
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keeping strict tabs on the water level and on White's use of the pond so as to prevent 
White from taking water to which he had no right. 
HI. WHITE HAD FAILED TO MARSHALL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT 
OF HIS CLAIM TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT AGAINST HIM 
White has addressed the judgment against him, but has not clearly requested that 
the Court set it aside. And apparently for good reason. While he argues the evidence of 
his dogs killing Randall's chickens, and killing Randall's foal, he argues only the 
evidence that supports his position. He fails to marshal any evidence contrary to his 
position. See Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, 973 P.2d 431, P24, 973 P.2d 431 "In 
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." (quoting W. 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv, Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). Smith v. 
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064(Utah 2003). 
Pamela Randall testified: "We was out - we had gone out to the corral to feed and 
the dogs had - the two dogs had come over and was chasing the chickens in the corral." 
(R. at 270, p. 389). . . . "Jerry was yelling at them; and they just kept chasing and kept 
chasing.... When I cam out, the dog had the chicken down." ... "[W]e seen the dog on the 
chicken, had it down, biting it." (Id. At pp. 390, 391) 
The Trial Court's ruling on the White dogs killing the Randall chickens is well 
documented and supported by the evidence heard at the time of trial. 
24 
IV.AS THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY OBSERVED, WHITE IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES OR PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES 
This court should affirm the trial court's ruling that no attorney's fees or punitive 
damages be awarded because Utah courts do not award attorney's fees unless expressly 
provided for by a contract or statute. See Arnica Mutual Ins, Co, v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 
950, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Likewise, punitive damages are not appropriate absent 
tortious conduct that willfully and maliciously violates the rights of another for which 
compensatory damages have already been awarded. See State Farm Mut, Auto, Ins, Co, 
v, Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). In addition to the fact that no compensatory damages 
were granted to White by the trial court, White is not entitled to punitive damages 
because in removing his pond, Randall did not commit a tort, was not acting maliciously 
or reprehensibly, and did not know he was interfering with any of White's rights. 
Whether White is entitled to punitive damages or attorneys fees is a question of 
law to be reviewed for correctness. Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 70 P.3d 47, 50 (Utah, 
2003). 
i. Because no contract or statute exists in this case allowing for the recovery 
of attorney's fees, White may not recover attorney's fees under Utah law 
Utah adheres to the prevailing common-law rule that attorney fees are not 
recoverable in the absence of a contractual or statutory basis." Arnica Mutual Insurance 
Co, v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Canyon Country Store 
v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 419 (Utah 1989) (citing Turtle Mgmt,y Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., 645 
P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982)). The Utah Supreme Court has enforced this principle by 
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holding that "[t]he courts of this state . . . should refrain from allowing the imposition of 
costs and expenses upon the losing party except such as are provided for by statute and 
such as by the consensus of the opinions of the courts by long and uniform usage have 
been allowed in certain cases as necessary for the protection of legal right." First Security 
Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982), quoting St. Joseph 
Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 195 P. 305 (Utah 1921). White admits that there is no applicable 
contract or statute allowing the recoveiy of attorney's fees in this case. (Memo in Support 
of Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Judgment, 2). Because no statute or court 
"consensus" exists on which to base an award of attorney fees, White is not entitled to 
attorney's fees under Utah law. 
Additionally, the Utah Court of Appeals favorably cited to Ross v. Cagley, 670 
P.2d 190 (Or. App. 1983), for the proposition that attorney's fees cannot be awarded in an 
"easement by implication" case. See Chase v. Scott, 38 P.3d 1001 (Utah App. 2001). In 
Rosst the court held that a party could not obtain attorney fees under a contract provision 
since plaintiff was awarded an easement by implication and had "sought neither 
enforcement of the contract nor damages for its breach, but to have certain rights declared 
which had not been made part of the contract." Id., quoting Ross v. Cagley, 670 P.2d 190, 
192 (Or. App. 1983). 
ii. Punitive damages are not appropriate as a means to award attorney's fees to 
White 
White contends that "plaintiffs attorney's fees may be recovered as an element of 
punitive damages" (A.B. 28). But he actually asks this Court to adopt a new rule that 
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once the Court awards punitive damages, it should then, automatically, award attorney's 
fees in addition to the punitives awarded. 
While Utah decisions have addressed, in dicta, that "the amount of attorney's fees 
expanded may be considered in calculating punitive damages, when punitive damages are 
warranted" Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), punitive damages are not warranted in this case and thus it would be legal error for 
the court to award White attorney's fees as an element of punitive damages. But even if 
they were, they would have to be "wrapped" into the punitive damage award, not the 
other way around. 
iii. Appellant's claim for punitive damages was and is procedurally and 
substantively improper. 
Plaintiffs initial proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which was 
adopted by the Court before granting Randall's motion to alter or amend, granted 
attorney's fees. There was, admittedly, no contract or statute upon which such an award 
could be based. 
In opposition to Randall's motion to strike the award of attorney's fees or to 
supplement findings, White filed an untimely motion to amend the Judgment to include 
an award of nominal punitive damages, in order to bootstrap an award of attorney's fees 
onto the Judgment. (R. at 163 - 168). Pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, such motions must be "made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment." 
The Trial Court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of an untimely motion. 
Davis v. Grand County Serv. Area. 905 P.2d 888 (Ut App 1995), citing Richins v. Delbert 
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Chipman & Sons Co.. 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah App. 1991) (Interpreting Rule 59 Motions 
for a new trial). 
In addition, our appellate courts have held that certain evidence and findings are 
necessary before punitive damages can be awarded. 
'A trial court should consider seven factors in assessing the 
amount of punitive damages: (1) the relative wealth of the 
defendant, (2) the nature of the alleged misconduct, (3) the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the misconduct, (4) the 
effect thereof upon the lives of the plaintiff and others, (5) the 
probability of future recurrence of the misconduct, (6) the 
relationship between the parties, and (7) the amount of actual 
damages awarded. 
VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Mack Dist., 758 P.2d 962, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In the trial of this case, there was no evidence presented at the time of trial on 
Defendant's relative wealth. No evidence was presented of his monthly income, nature of 
any income producing enterprises or labors, nor any evidence of any personal assets or 
holdings. Any award of punitive damages would have to be either based upon a guess, or 
without considering this factor. This factor alone should be enough to preclude an award 
of punitive damages, although Plaintiff failed to also put on any evidence of any of the 
factors contained in elements 4, 5 and 7 of the VanDyke decision. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Court granted no compensatory damages to 
White. Only Randall was awarded compensatory damages. 
iv. Punitive damages are only appropriate where the conduct was willful, 
malicious, and violated the right of another 
Punitive damages are not appropriate here because in Utah, punitive damages may 
be awarded only "where the nature of the wrong complained of and the injury inflicted 
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goes beyond merely violating the rights of another in that it is found to be willful and 
malicious." First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 598 
(Utah 1982), quoting Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980). When he destroyed 
his pond, Randall did not know he was violating the rights of another, and thus his actions 
can not be considered willful and malicious. At that time, White had not established that 
he was entitled to any sort of easement—implied or express—onto the property. No 
express easement was included in any of the deeds of sale of the parcels made from 
Hancock to White or Randall (R. at 269, pp. 93-94). Though Hancock testified that 
Randall knew about White's use of the pond when she sold Randall the property, she 
admitted that because it was so long ago, she could not remember whether she discussed 
the White's use of the pond and water with Randall or with the real estate agent (R. at 
269, p. 89). Therefore, it can not be assumed that Randall knew or should have known of 
an implied easement on the property. 
White cites Falkenburg v. Neff as a case in which the court stated "that the 
destruction of the diverting works . . . is a sufficient legal basis for awarding exemplary 
damages is a proposition too plain for argument." Falkenburg v. Neff, 269 P. 1008 (Utah 
1928). That case is clearly distinguishable and inapplicable to these facts: there, the 
plaintiff had gone to considerable cost and labor constructing a dam and diverting works 
in a canyon of difficult access. The defendants, despite having no claim or right to the 
water being diverted, demolished the dam and then went to the plaintiffs home to warn 
him against rebuilding the structure. Id. at 1012. 
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Randall removed a pond which was situated on his own property. White had no 
rights in the pond, other than his rights to the irrigation water which flowed through the 
pond and a ditch down to his property; the State Engineer had granted him no rights to 
store or impound his irrigation water in Randall's pond. Randall had gone out of his way 
to help White access his irrigation water from the ditch flowing into the pond by 
constructing a new ditch through which to divert the water. Randall's conduct exhibited a 
diligent attempt to reach a workable solution with White and is not analogous to the 
"willful and malicious" conduct present in Falkenburg. 
v. Punitive damages may not be awarded in the absence of a tort and 
compensatory damages 
The trial court did not award White any compensatory damages, which are a 
necessary prerequisite to punitive damages. Nor did the court find any tortious conduct 
by Randall, without which punitive damages cannot be awarded: 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has enforced the Utah statute by stating, "the general rule 
is that there can be no punitive damages without compensatory damages based on the tort 
. . . the failure to allege and prove a tort giving rise to compensatory damage vitiates the 
claim for punitive damage." Graham v. Street, 270 P.2d 456, 459 (Utah 1954), citing 
Gilham v. Devereaux, 214 P. 606 (Mont. 1923). In this case, both the tort requirement 
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and the necessary compensary damages are conspicuously absent, and thus punitive 
damages are not justifiable. 
vi. The U.S. Supreme Court has limited punitive damages to cases where the 
defendant's conduct is reprehensible and compensatory damages are 
ordered 
To award punitive damages in favor of White would violate the instruction of the 
United States Supreme Court. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408 (2003), the Supreme Court explained that the reprehensibility of the defendant's 
conduct is the foremost element to be considered in deteimining if punitive damages are 
reasonable. Id. at 419. The Court outlined the factors to be considered in evaluating the 
reprehensibility of an action and suggested that any action lacking any aspect of 
reprehensibility should not be awarded punitive damages: 
We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a 
defendant by considering whether: the harm caused was physical as 
opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference 
to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target 
of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved 
repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the 
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. 
The existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a 
plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; 
and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect. It should 
be presumed a plaintiff has been made whole for his injuries by 
compensatory damages, so punitive damages should only be 
awarded if the defendant's culpability, after having paid 
compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the 
imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or 
deterrence. 
Id. at 419, citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 
575-577 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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Randall's action of leveling the pond was in no way reprehensible and thus 
punitive damages are not justified. First, the harm allegedly caused to White was purely 
economic, in the form of White not being able to flood irrigate his property. No physical 
harm was inflicted on White as a result of Randall destroying his pond. Second, 
Randall's action was not "tortuous conduct" and was not performed in a reckless or 
unsafe manner. Third, there is no evidence suggesting that alleged target of the conduct, 
White, had financial vulnerability. Both parties involved in this dispute are individuals 
and thus no significant disparity in financial condition exists. Fourth, the conduct was 
clearly an isolated incident, as there was only one pond on Randall's property. Finally, 
while the destruction of the pond was intentional, it was not done with malice, trickery or 
deceit. The pond was located on Randall's property and no easement of any kind had 
been established in favor of White. To his knowledge, Randall was not infringing on any 
rights of White; thus by removing the pond on his own property, Randall had no malice 
or intent to infringe upon White's rights. Furthermore, Randall had recently learned from 
the Division of Water Sources that he had no right to store water on his property; 
therefore in leveling the pond he was simply attempting to adhere to the law. For these 
reasons, Randall's actions were not reprehensible and punitive damages should not be 
awarded to White. 
In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), the Supreme 
Court also laid out a second element to be considered in determining punitive damages 
after the reprehensibility component—the amount of compensatory damages. The Court 
explained that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
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compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." Id. at 425. 
Because the trial court has not awarded White any compensatory damages, any amount of 
punitive damages would exceed the reasonable ratio requirement provided by the 
Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, this court should uphold the trial court's judgment 
and find that: 1) White is entitled to an implied easement in the space where the pond 
once was, limited to the size of the ditch which conveyed water both to and from the now 
non-existent pond; 2) White is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees; and 3) White is 
not entitled to punitive damages; and 4) Randall's compensatory damage award was 
proper and supported by competent evidence. 
DATED and signed t h i s ' ^ day of April, 2006. 
^MMES G. CLARK, Attorney 
C'For Defendant Jerry Randall 
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Exhibit 1. 
Transcript of Judges partial findings of fact and conclusion issued orally following 
closing argument 
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granted that by implication and verbally to Mr. White. I don't 
think there can be any doubt about that. That easement had 
been created out of conduct that had preceded this by many 
years. 
Let me say this, too. Mr. Clark takes us to task 
for not fully investigating the history of this water delivery 
system. That's not an issue in this case. Just look at this 
case. The historical access is not only not an issue, but it 
was not proven by any means. 
What happened was — and even Mr. Randall agreed, 
that the way Whites were using the water was the same way that 
Jordan had used it, and that was the same way that Tibbs had 
used it. That's it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CLARK: Your Honor, if I may approach? 
THE COURT: Sure. Thanks. Let me start by finding 
facts, and see where that leads me. I kind of think I'm going 
to have to read this out of some case, but let's see where the 
facts lead. So make your notes, and if you think I'm missing 
anything, let me know. 
There's one plaintiff named in this case, Leon J. 
White. He's an individual, and he resides in Sanpete County. 
There's one defendant, and that's Jerry Randall, and he's an 
individual, and he resides in Sanpete County. 
I've heard from other witnesses in this case, and one 
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1 I of themf who was a representative of the irrigation company, 
2 and I think there is an irrigation company called the Indianola 
3 J Irrigation Company that's presently organized and operating, 
4 I and has the authority to operate as an irrigation company. 
5 I've also heard from a person named Kaziah May Hancock, and 
6 I she's an individual. 
7 On July 27th, 1995 Kaziah May Hancock, who was then 
8 known as Kaziah May Jordan, owned some property in Sanpete 
9 I County. The property she owned, the best I can say is that 
10 there are three different legal descriptions of property which 
11 I are all contiguous, all next to each other, and she and her 
12 former husband, Ivan Douglas Jordan owned this property in 
13 Sanpete County. 
14 I One of the parcels is described in Exhibit No. 2. The 
15 J other parcels I don't know that I've got descriptions for, but 
16 J the three parcels could be lined up so that they proceed from 
17 the east to west. If we call the eastern most parcel No. 1, 
18 I then there's a middle parcel No. 2 and a western parcel No. 3. 
19 On July 28th, 1995 Hancock conveyed to the plaintiff 
20 J what I've just referred to as parcel No. 2, the middle of the 
21 three parcels. Hancock continued to own parcel No. 1. Parcel 
22 No. 3, I don't know about. Maybe I don't need to know about 
23 parcel No. 3. I don't see anything in the exhibits about 
24 parcel No. 3. 
25 There's another person whose name is important, and 
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1 that name is Don Tibbs. In 1967 he caused the irrigation pond 
2 to be built on the plat known as parcel No. 1. Water was 
3 J introduced into the pond and he used it. 
4 MR. CLARK: I'm sorryf your Honor, what year again? 
5 THE COURT: I think 1967, because I think Mrs. Tibbs 
6 talked about this check that she — 
7 MR. CLARK: 1987? 
8 THE COURT: You're right. 
9 MR. CLARK: Okay. I'm sorry, I — 
10 THE COURT: You are right. When this irrigation pond 
11 I was constructed it included the earthwork for a dam to restrain 
12 the flow of water, and in the dam there were some parts that 
13 would allow mechanisms to be moved and the valve to be opened 
14 so that water could be released. 
15 Tibbs used the water that was impounded by the dam. 
16 Sometimes he used it by opening the structure and allowing the 
17 water to flow out by gravity. Sometimes he used it by opening 
18 I the structure and allowing the water to flow into a pump'. He 
19 took the water off site by either of those two methods. 
20 I think he did that until — well, I have to tell you, 
21 I don't know how long he did that. Hancock bought the property 
22 in 1988, and I don't know whether Tibbs kept using the water 
23 after she bought it or not. Put a question mark by that, and 
24 let me keep my train of thought going here, and maybe you can 
25 come back and enlighten me about how you remember the evidence. 
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1 Hancock said parcel No. 2 was irrigated by a method 
2 I which many people call sub-irrigation, which I think is a 
3 shortcut way of saying subterranean irrigation. 
4 MR. MARTINEAU: I'm sorry, I didn't hear the last — 
5 THE COURT: I think that the term "sub-irrigation" 
6 stands for subterranean irrigation, and I think that term 
7 I means that water flows under the surface of the earth through 
8 I subterranean channels, and if they're — if it comes in contact 
9 with the roots of plants growing on the surface, then the roots 
10 make use of the water. When water was released from the pond 
11 j and allowed to run by way of gravity, it somehow fostered this 
12 I subterranean irrigation. 
13 In 1996 and every year thereafter, including 2003, 
14 Mr. White went to the pond, operated the mechanism that caused 
15 the valve to open and water to be released, and allowed the 
16 water to flow. 
17 Mr. White is an owner of shares in the irrigation 
18 I company. I have to admit, I've got to put a question mark by 
19 I that, too. I've got evidence that he bought shares from 
20 Hancock, but I've also got Mrs. Bigler who came and testified 
21 and couldn't produce any proof that shows that Mr. White's a 
22 I shareholder. So I'd like the Whites to tell me about that. 
23 J Mr. Randall bought parcel No. 1 in 1996 from Ms. 
24 J Hancock and he inspected the property before he bought it and 
25 I saw the earthen dam and the structure that had moving parts 
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that allowed a valve to be open. 
I think those are the facts that I've got from the 
evidence. What do you think about that listr Mr. Martineau? 
MR. MARTINEAU: Well, May Jordan did say that before 
the sub-irrigation began that she needed to flood the property 
and then she would put in the sub-irrigation. 
THE COURT: What do you think about thatr Mr. Clark? 
MR. CLARK: Are you keeping me from doing what the 
Judge is doing? I'm just — okay. Your Honorr I'm not sure, 
but I think you said that Mr. Randall bought this property in 
1991. 
THE COURT: I meant to say 1996. 
MR. CLARK: *96, okay. Otherwise, your Honor, I think 
those are fair statements. Frankly, I think you've made a 
finding that starting in or about 1996, Mr. White manipulated 
the mechanisms and opened the valves and allowed water to flow. 
I don't know that — I mean, I suppose the Court could find 
that. I don't know that that's an uncontested fact. We think 
that he started — he don't think he acquired the water rights 
until x97. He didn't move onto the property until *97. 
Frankly, probably didn't start irrigating until *98. S o — 
THE COURT: What do you think about that, Mr. 
Martineau? 
MR. MARTINEAU: I didn't get that completely. I'm 
really sorry, your Honor. 
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1 I MR. CLARK: I'm sorry. I'd be glad to speak up. Do 
2 I you want me to do it again? 
3 THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Martineau. 
4 MR. CLARK: Okay. 
5 THE COURT: What do you think was the first year that 
6 J Mr. White went to the valve and opened it? 
7 MR. MARTINEAU: 1985 — 1995, when he bought the 
8 J property. That was his testimony several times. 
9 THE COURT: So that's contested. 
10 MR. CLARK: Yeah. He didn't have the water rights at 
11 J that time, but I don't know if he was leasing them or whatever. 
12 I don't think we have any evidence of that one way or the 
13 I other. 
14 MR. MARTINEAU: I would like, if I could, to augment 
15 the record, if the Court would allow, and indicate these are 
16 I the (inaudible) certificates. 
17 THE COURT: Show them to Mr. Clark. 
18 MR. MARTINEAU: I think those indicate the dates. 
19 THE COURT: Have you seen these before, Mr. Clark? 
20 MR. CLARK: No, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: How did they get here, Mr. Martineau? 
22 MR. MARTINEAU: They got here from Mr. White. I asked 
23 him to bring them today. 
24 MR. CLARK: This is — I think this is clearly the — 
25 I well, the well water that was conveyed with the original deed. 
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MR. MARTINEAU: I don't know if it's well water or if 
it's an additional share, but it is the share that went with 
the original conveyance, your Honor. I think this is in 
evidence. 
THE COURT: Hang on. Let me ask Mr. Clark a question. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Okay. This is the original deed and 
there is the — 
MR. CLARK: Yeah, I think that is this one share right 
here. It's probably even dated the same. My guess would be 5 
— somewhere around the time of 5/12 of *95? 
MR. MARTINEAU: This one? 
MR. CLARK: Oops, no. The 28th of July '95. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Well, it took awhile to get them — 
MR. CLARK: 24, yea. So that's — yeah, just took 
a few days to do the closing. So I think that goes with this 
conveyance. We don't have any problem with that, your Honor. 
MR. MARTINEAU: The testimony was clear that 
thereafter Mr. White bought 10 more shares and that was in 
these. 
THE COURT: Mr. Clark, I think what Mr. Martineau 
wants to have done is have these marked as exhibits, and have 
them received in evidence. 
MR. CLARK: Your Honor, I — unfortunately I'm — I 
would love to be able to just stipulate to that, but I'm 
somewhat uncomfortable with it in light of the fact that the 
-534-
1 evidence is closed. We no longer have — we don't even have 
2 anybody to set a foundation for them of any kind. 
3 MR. MARTINEAU: I'll be glad to — 
4 MR. CLARK: I would assume that Mr. White should be in 
5 I possession of the originals. Do we — if we had the originals 
6 I for me to look at I might be more comfortable with it. 
7 MR. MARTINEAU: These are the originals, aren't they? 
8 MR. WHITE: Nof these are copies. 
9 MR. MARTINEAU: 0hr your Honor. Mr. White could get -
10 - could connect them, though. 
11 THE COURT: Both of these items can be marked as 
12 exhibits, and the foundation's been proffered by Mr. Martineau. 
13 It would be Mr. White testifying. They're both received in 
14 evidence. 
15 MR. CLARK: Okay. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you. 
17 (Exhibit Nos. 15 and 16 received into evidence) 
18 THE COURT: I did think of some other facts that I 
19 should find. Chickens were killed by dogs under the control of 






MR. CLARK: $178, I think, your Honor. 
MR. MARTINEAU: I didn't hear that, I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: The value is the number that Mr. Clark 
said. I forget, except it ended in 8. 
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1 MR. CLARK: $198. 
2 THE COURT: $198. 
3 MR. MARTINEAU: $198 for the chickens. 
4 I THE COURT: It's more likely than not that the horse 
5 was killed by the actions of the dog. The problem is that I 
6 J don't have a value I can rely on. The only evidence I've got 
7 is that the horse would be worth $1,000 if it was alive at some 
8 I future date. I don't have any evidence about what it was worth 
9 on the day that it died. At least that's how I view the 
10 evidence. So I'm not going to award any damages for the loss 
11 of the horse. 
12 I I have to tell your Mr. Martineau, I'm still troubled 
13 by the idea of imposing on Mr. Randall the knowledge of the 
14 easement that's implied, and having that knowledge have to 
15 J arise in his mind based on what he could see on the property in 
16 July of 1996. 
17 I I mean, he could see the pond and he could see the 
18 I diversion works, but how does he know that that's in Mr. 
19 I White's favor, or that it benefits a certain a piece of 
20 I property? 
21 MR. MARTINEAU: In this case, to answer that, it says 
22 I all that needs to be is it needs to — that — I think it — 
23 there has to be a reasonable connection between the use and 
24 what was there. I asked him. He walked the property. He had 
25 I to know that the pond was there. He had to know the ditches 
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1 were there. 
2 So with that in mindf even if you don't believe 
3 Mrs. Hancock's testimony that she told either the agent or him 
4 J about Mr. White having that facility, he had to know that just 
5 J from what was there, and he had a duty in inquire whether that 
6 I system was then in place. It didn't serve anything on his 
7 property. The pond didn't serve anything on his property. 
8 There's no doubt either that he raised the issue of 
9 I the pond in connection with the negotiation of the purchase 
10 I price. 
11 So I think it's covered in this case he was on the property; he 
12 knew what was there; he admitted that. He walked the property.. 
13 He knew what was there. It was open, obvious. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Martineau, if I asked you to 
15 prepare for me a map of this parcel No. 1 that I've talked 
16 about, and to locate on it the pond and the house, and to label 
17 the various sides with dimensions, you could probably do that 
18 with your own resources or somebody in your office to help you 
19 do that? 
20 MR. MARTINEAU: Sure, I could. 
21 THE COURT: And you could probably do the same thing, 
22 I couldn't you, Mr. Clark? 
23 | MR. CLARK: I believe so. 
24 I THE COURT: That would sure help me answer the 
25 I question about how much knowledge I can have implied on Mr. 
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1 I Randall, because it seems like the positioning of those things 
2 I may be important. So — 
3 I MR. CLARK: Do you need this in some kind of 
4 J topographical form? 
5 THE COURT: No. 
6 MR. CLARK: Okay. 
7 THE COURT: No, I don't care about that, because then 
8 I you'd have to go survey and show the contour lines, and I — 
9 MR. CLARK: Okay. We've got one of those. We just 
10 download it off the Internet. I'll share it with everybody. 
11 MR. MARTINEAU: I (inaudible) photograph, and to put 
12 I it all on there in the photograph. Get some kind of a scale 
13 J that indicates the distance. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. This is what I'm going to do, since 
15 we're out of time again. I've given my findings of facts. I'm 
16 going to impose on both the lawyers to give me a (inaudible) 
17 J and findings of fact. 
18 I I'm going to impose on both lawyers to provide for me 
19 la map of what I've described as parcel No. 1, and to give me 
20 that map so that it fits on an 8-and-a-half by 11 inch piece of 
21 I paper, and it's got original dimensions of the various calls 
22 I and the legal description, plus it places the pond and the 
23 I house in relation to the boundaries and in relation to each 
24 other. So it's got to be a scaled drawing that shows me those 
25 I things. 
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1 I Then submit those to me along with a proposed conclusions of 
2 J law. 
3 In the meantime I'm going to be reading Adams on vs. 
4 I Brockbank with a close eye, and if you want to submit with your 
5 I documents particular quotes from Adamson vs. Brockbank,, feel 
6 free. 
7 1 I'd like to have those papers from each of you by the 
8 24th of December. I'm picking a day that's about a month from 
9 today, but I'm negotiable on that. 
10 MR. MARTINEAU: When, your Honor? 
11 THE COURT: The 24th of December, but I'm negotiable on 
12 that. 
13 MR. MARTINEAU: I have no trouble on that, because I 
14 I have an important hearing in Grand Junction on next week, all 
15 J next week. I might not — then I've to have another trial in 
16 early December, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: What about the 10th of January? 
18 MR. MARTINEAU: The 10th of January would be better. 
19 THE COURT: What about for you, Mr. Clark? 
20 MR. CLARK: Your Honor, I'm sorry. If you could give 
21 I me just a moment. This whole thing's a nightmare. I'm going 
22 I on my first family vacation in forever the last week in 
23 I December. It looks like I won't be back until like the 4th — 
2 4 I 5th. 
25 I THE COURT: How about the 20th of January? You pick a 
-539-
1 day. 
2 MR. CLARK: Your Honor, the 20 — frankly, that ought 
3 J to be good. I don't see a reason why that shouldn't be doable. 
4 J The 20th of January ought to be fine. Could we do it the end of 
5 the week, maybe the 23rd? 
6 THE COURT: Okay. I want simultaneous submissions. I 
7 want you both to — 
8 MR. CLARK: Oh, okay. 
9 THE COURT: I want you both to fax your documents so 
10 they both come in on the 23rd of January, and you don't have a 
11 chance to see each other's until that day. 
12 MR. CLARK: Mr. Martineau, does that work okay for 
13 you, the 23rd? 
14 MR. MARTINEAU: Yes. 
15 MR. CLARK: Okay. I just — I don't want to extend it 
16 too long, your Honor, and yet I want to make sure we have an 
17 I adequate opportunity to do this. Okay. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. I think we're done for today. 
19 MR. CLARK: Thank you, your Honor. I appreciate your 
20 — 
21 MR. MARTINEAU: The Court has entered an order that 
22 these people not get in each other's hair in the meantime. Can 
23 I that continue in effect? 
24 THE COURT: The parties are ordered to keep the peace, 
25 ordered to be obedient to all laws. You're ordered not to 
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1 I speak disrespectfully of each other to anybody. You're not to 
2 make rude gestures. I think that's all I intend do 
3 (inaudible). 
4 MR. CLARK: Okay. Thank your your Honor. That sounds 
5 appropriate. 
6 MR. MARTINEAU: Shall I prepare a formal order on 
7 that? 
8 THE COURT: If you would I would appreciate it. 
9 MR. MARTINEAU: Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Morgan's (inaudible). 
11 MR. CLARK: Thank you, your Honor. 
12 MR. MARTINEAU: Thank you. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you. The Court's in recess. 
14 (Trial concluded) 
Exhibit 2. 
Letter from the Judge referencing loss of file and adoption of 
White's proposed findings and conclusions. 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
district Judge David L. Mower Brent Bowcutt, Court Executive 
district Judge K. L. Mclff Peggy k. Johnson, Clerk of Court 
uvenile Judge Paul D. Lyman 
September 3, 2004 
Mr. Reed L. Martineau 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Mr. James G. Clark 
Attorney at Law 
The Robley Building 
90 East 100 South 
Provo, UT 84606 
Gentlemen: 
RE: Sanpete Co. Case No. 030600302, White vs. Randall 
My apologies to you and to your clients for the delay in issuing a decision in this case. 
Apparently we allowed the file to become lost. After it was brought to my attention, I spent 
some time reviewing the file and listening to the record or the witnesses who testified. 
In the process I have become convinced that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law prepared by Mr. Martineau reflect the decision that I desire to make. Hence, I have 
signed that pleading. A copy of it with my signature is enclosed. 
I am instructing the clerk to file the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
State Courts Building 
895 East 300 North, Richfield, Utah 84701 
Phone 435-896-2700 
Court Executive 435-896-2710 
030600302 
September 3, 2004 
Page 2 
Mr. Martineau, would you please prepare an appropriate Judgment or instruct the clerk 
as to what should happen next in this case. 
Very truly yours, 
David L. Mower 
District Court Judge 
cc: Sanpete County Clerk 
State Courts Building 
895 East 300 North, Richfield, Utah 84701 
Phone 435-896-2700 
Court Executive 435-896-2710 
Exhibit 3. 
Judgement prepared by White's counsel. 
REED L. MARTINEAU (A2106) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Telecopy: (801) 363-0400 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030600302 
Judge David L. Mower 
This action came on for trial before the Court sitting 
without a jury beginning on October 10, 2003, and concluding on 
November 26, 2 003, before the Honorable David K. Mower. The Court 
now having reviewed the file, and having listened to the record 
of the testimony of the witnesses and reviewed the exhibits, and 
having considered the law applicable to this matter, and the Court 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein, 
and good cause appearing therefor, 
SANPETE GC'JNi"-. ;L.-.--. 





IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED and judgment is 
hereby entered against defendant Jerry Randall and in favor of 
plaintiff Leon J. White as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Leon J. White holds a valid easement for the 
use and enjoyment of the delivery system, including the pond and 
the ditches to and from the pond, as used and enjoyed previously 
by Kaziah May Jordan Hancock and by Leon J. White, without change, 
for the delivery of his water rights, until July 2 003 when the pond 
was destroyed by Jerry Randall. 
2. Defendant Jerry Randall's conduct in obstructing and 
changing the water delivery system was without permission of 
Leon J. White, which permission was never requested or received. 
3. Defendant Jerry Randall's conduct in destroying the pond, 
rendering the entire water delivery system unusable and leaving 
plaintiff Leon J. White with no means to use and enjoy his property 
and water rights was without right and was willful and malicious. 
4. Defendant Jerry Randall is not entitled to recover for 
his alleged loss of a foal or chickens. 
5. Defendant Jerry Randall is obligated to pay to Leon J. 
White the cost of restoration of the ponds and the water delivery 
system to their condition at the time they were destroyed and/or 
render useless. 
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6. Defendant Jerry Randall is hereby enjoined from threat-
ening or causing bodily harm to Leon J. White or other members of 
his family. 
7. Leon J. White is entitled to recover from Jerry Randall 
his costs, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein. 
DATED AND ENTERED this •XT. day of September, 2 004 
Approved as to form: 
JAMES G. CLARK 
BY THE COURT: 
Qjlu, 
David X^ Mower, District Court Judge 
L . 





Randall's notice of objection to proposed judgment and Randall's motion and 
memorandum to alter, amend, or supplement findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
?.igi| qrp 28 PPi p °7 
JAMES G, CLARK, USB #3637 
Attorney for Defendant Jerry Randall 
Utah County Executive Bldg 
60E100S,STE100 
Provo, UT 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-1717 
Facsimile: (801)375-1172 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




JERRY RANDALL, Civil No. 030600302 
Defendant. Judge: David L. Mower 
/ 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his counsel, and files this objection to the 
proposed Judgment filed by Plaintiff in this matter with regard to the Trial of October 10, 2003. 
Defendant received a proposed Judgment on or about September 15, 2004. Pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 4-504 (2) Utah Rules Judicial Administration, Defendant hereby files a Notice 
of Objection regarding the proposed Judgment. 
NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS 
1. The findings adopted by the Court are insufficient to justify the proposed 
Judgment and must be supplemented prior to the entry of Judgment. This Court needs to 
articulate, in greater detail, the steps by which he reached his ultimate conclusions. 
i \ f " . I O I I I . « ' ' - -" -
SANPETE CJ:;;:T':' CL_:: 
2. The Judgment and Findings of Fact appears to make an award of money damages 
to Plaintiff, in paragraph 5, but has indicated the damage sum. No evidence of damages was put 
on, and no issue in this case was bifurcated. The award of money damages is ambiguous and 
open ended and must be struck form any judgment in its present form. 
3. The Judgment in this case, grants an easement for the passage of irrigation water 
across Randall's land and also grants Plaintiff an easement in the Randall pond. BoU. were 
found to exist as "easements by implication." This Court needs to articulate, in greater detail, the 
steps by which he reached his ultimate conclusions not only in the ditches and canals, but also in 
the pond itself. In addition, the Court needs to make specific findings with regard to the volume 
of the pond, the length of time during which water may be impounded, the volume that can be 
withdrawn from the pond, the source of water that Plaintiff can use for irrigation purposes, 
responsibility to maintain the easement, and other specifics necessary to govern the relationship 
between the parties after this case is over with. 
4. The Judgment prepared by Plaintiff includes an award of Attorney fees to the 
Plaintiff. The Court has recognized no cause of action which provides for attorney's fees and has 
made no findings or conclusions supporting such an award. The law in Utah is that attorney's 
fees are not recoverable absent a statute or contract which provides for such an award. This 
Court must articulate, in greater detail, the steps by which he reached his ultimate conclusions 
regarding an award of attorney's fees in this case. 
5. The Court made specific findings of fact on the record, and entered a partial 
judgment for the Defendant at the time of Trial, that are not contained in Plaintiffs Judgment. 
The judgment prepared doss not comply with the Court's prior Judgment and ruling. 
6. The Defendant objects to Judgment, and respectfully requests that the Court deny 
the entry of the proposed Judgment until the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law can be 
supplemented, or in the alternative, that it set this matter for further hearings before the Court. 
DATED AND SIGNED t h i s ^ ^ T d a y of September, 2004. 
JA#f£< 
^ C t t O I T K 
S G. CLARK 
ttorney for Jerry Randall 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, Notice of 
Objection to Judgment, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Reed L. Martineau 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
DATED AND SIGNED this ^ 7 * H a y of September, 2004. 
JAMES G. CLARK, #3637 
Utah County Executive Bldg. 
60 East 100 South, Ste 100 
Provo, UT 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-1717 
Facsimile: (801)375-1172 
FiLFD 
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KRISTINE Fiii3Cii;.,-.;c.c:ir 
SANPETE COUNTY CLERK 
»YlBE&(WU#L DEPUTY 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEON J. WHITE, 
Plaintiff, 
MOTION TO ALTER, AMEND OR 
SUPPLEMENT FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
JERRY RANDALL, Civil No. 030600302 
Defendant. Judge: David L. Mower 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Jerry Randall, by and through counsel, James G. Clark, and 
moves this Court to alter or amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or to make additional 
findings and supplement the record thereby. This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules Civil 
Procedure and is supported by the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
DATED and SIGNED this:27^av of September, 2004. 
GCLARK 
(ttomey for Jerry Randall 
\1% 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I: 
jxmailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, Motion to Alter, Amend, or 
Supplement the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid and 
addressed as follows; or 
hand-delivered to the following: or 
sent by facsimile to the following: 
REED L. MARTINUEU 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
PO BOX 45000 
S.L.C.,UT. 84145 
DATED AND SIGNED this^Z^ay of September, 2004 
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JAMES G. CLARK, #3637 ^ j ! j ' ^ i ; , ^ ^ - ; ; / . : 
Utah County Executive Bldg. ^ u
 luJ 
60 East 100 South, Ste 100 BY -iSOaMAWC- OEFU r 
Provo, UT 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-1717 
Facsimile: (801)375-1172 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEON J WHITE, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ALTER, 
Plaintiff, AMEND OR SUPPLEMENT FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
vs LAW 
JERRY RANDALL, Civil No. 030600302 
Defendant. Judge: David L. Mower 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel James G. Clark, and files this 
Memorandum in support of Defendant's Motion to Alter, Amend and/or Supplement Findings 
previously adopted by the Court. It is Defendant's position, in part, that this Court needs to articulate, 
in greater detail, the steps by which he reached his ultimate conclusions that an easement by implication 
exists in the pond, that Plaintiff be awarded attorney's fees, and that the Court's prior findings and 
judgment should not be entered. 
MEMORANDUM 
FACTS: 
1. On or about September 3rd, 2004 the Court sent a letter to the Attorney's indicating 
that the Courts file had become lost or misplaced, that the Court had started to review the tapes of the 
proceedings, and had decided to adopt the proposed findings filed by Mr. Martineau. 
2. A motion was previously made by the Defendant on or about March 12th, 2004, to 
Strike the Proposed Finding filed by Mr. Martineau. That Motion has not been ruled on by the Court 
and remains outstanding. 
3. That at the time of the Trial in this case, and particularly on November 26, 2003, the 
Court made a decision and cited on record partial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
4. The Proposed Findings adopted by the Court are on file herein, and will not be recited 
in connection with this Motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE FINDINGS ADOPTED BY THE COURT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO 
JUSTIFY THE JUDGMENT AND MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED 
In this case, the Court adopted wholesale the proposed findings of fact prepared by Plaintiffs 
counsel and directed counsel to prepare a judgment in connection therewith. The Judgment prepared 
by Plaintiffs counsel grants relief that is not fully supported by the Court's findings and is inconsistent 
with prior findings made by this Court. 
2 
Any Judgment made by the Court must be supported by sufficient findings. As our Supreme 
Court has provided: 
"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles. 2002 UT 48, ffif 14, 48 P.3d 968 
(citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). This 
requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows for correction 
at that time in the course of the proceeding. Badger. 966 P.2d at 847. For a trial court 
to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error "(1) the issue must be raised in a 
timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and (3) the challenging party 
must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Brookside, 2002 UT 
48 at ffi[ 14 (quoting Badger, 966 P.2d at 847). 
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., No. 20010629, Filed August 24, 2004, 2004 UT 72 
There are some aspects of the Findings of Fact which the Defendant believes to be either 
inconsistent with the evidence which was submitted at the time of trial, or not adequately supported by 
factual findings in connection with the trial itself. In addition, the defendant believes that the Court has 
adopted partial facts which paint a false light of the evidence presented at the time of trial. 
FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE: 
In U 1, May Jordan testified that she and her husband allowed water to flow from the pond at 
approximately the same rate the water came into the pond. The pond was not used for the purpose of 
impounding, storing, and flood irrigating the Connally property. May Jordan referred to her irrigation 
technique as subterranean irrigation, and indicated that it was more than adequate. In addition, the 
Jordans conveyed the real property to White in 1995. The Jordans did not irrigate the Connally 
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property from 1995 thru 1997. Therefore, the period of time during which the Jordan's used the pond 
for irrigation was approximately seven (7) years. 
The findings in % 2 indicate that White acquired his irrigation rights in November, 1995. 
However, the documents filed with the Court as exhibits indicate that the water rights were acquired in 
March, 1996 or 1997, after the Randalls signed a purchase agreement with Jordans for "Parcel 1." 
That the water rights acquired in 1997 by White were the Connally water rights which had been 
historically delivered by way of the meeting house wash. The Jordans were the first to use these rights 
on the old Spencer property, directly west of White's house. 
That Mr. White testified that he built his house on the property and completed the house and 
moved in the year 2000. Prior to that he had a trailer on the property but did not maintain primary 
residence there. Mr. White did not remember specifically when he began to irrigate the western 
Spencer property with the Connally water rights, but it was not later than the year 2000. In 2002 
White did not use his irrigation water rights as he had leased them to another party. 
THE OMITTED COURT'S FINDINGS: 
That at the time of the trial the Court made specific findings of fact on the record which are not 
contained in Plaintiffs findings. The Court specifically found that in July, 1995 May Hancock nka 
Jordan owned property with three(3) legal parcels in Sanpete County. Pursuant to exhibit no.2, the 
Court referred to those parcels as the Eastern no. 1, the middle no. 2, and the Western no. 3. After the 
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conveyance to White in July of'95, Jordan continued to own parcel no. 1 which was subsequently sold 
to the Randall's in March '96. The Court also found that Don Tibbs in 1987 built a pond on parcel no. 
1 consisting of an earth work dam and some mechanism to allow the release of water ("head gate"). 
Tibbs used impounded water, sometimes by gravity and sometimes by pump and took water off site to 
other parcels he was farming. Tibbs continued to do this until 1988 when the property was sold to 
Jordans. 
The Court reports specifically found that May Jordan used the water in the pond for 
subterranean irrigation of parcel 2 and parcel 3, not flood irrigation. 
The Court specifically found that Randall bought his property in 1996 and at the time of the 
purchase was able to see the dam and the moving structures or mechanism that could be used to 
control water level and there was an apparent ditch or canal of some kind which flowed into the pond 
and an apparent ditch or canal of some kind that flowed out of the pond to the west however, at the 
time of contracting to purchase the property there were no water rights in use to the west of parcel no. 
1. 
The Court specifically found that the Randalls' chickens were killed by dogs under the control 
of White and that the value of the chickens was as testified to by Randalls. The court found that 50 
chickens were killed and 2 turkeys. Of the chickens that were killed, 8 were polish, 6 were silkis, 6 
were malaflair, and two foul were turkeys. That a farm chicken has a reasonable value of five dollars, a 
5 
polish eight dollars, a silkis eight dollars, a malaflair six dollars, and a turkey twenty dollars. 
Randall also claimed that one of White's dogs caused the death of a new born colt. The Court 
found it more likely than not that the horse was killed by a dog owned by or in control of White. 
However, the Court found that Randall had failed to establish the value of the loss and therefor denied 
any damages. 
The Court also specifically found that the question of whether an easement by implication exists 
is a problem in this case. It is clear that the pond was apparent, the diversion works were apparent, 
and some type of canal or trench ran into and out of the pond. 
In % 6, the findings indicate that Tibbs rebuilt the dam and enlarged the pond "soon after" the 
early summer of 1983. The Court specifically found in its decision that the dam had been built, based 
on invoices provided by Mrs. Tibbs, in 1987. 
Paragraph 15 is expressly contrary to the decision made by the Court on the record following 
the trial. 
UNSUPPORTED FINDINGS AND INSUFFICIENT FINDINGS: 
In this case, the Judgment grants an easement for the passage of irrigation water across 
Randalls' land and also grants Plaintiff an easement in the Randall pond. Both were found to exist as 
"easements by implication." In order to find an easement by implication, the Court must find, at the 
least: 
"In determining whether the circumstances under which a conveyance of land is made 
imply an easement, the following factors are important: 
(a) Whether the claimant is the conveyor or the conveyee, 
(b) The terms of the conveyance, 
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(c) The consideration given for it, 
(d) Whether the claim is made against a simultaneous conveyee, 
(e) The extent of necessity of the easement to the claimant, 
(f) Whether reciprocal benefits result to the conveyor and the conveyee, 
(g) The manner in which the land was used prior to its conveyance, 
(h) The extent to which the manner of prior use was or might have been known to the 
parties." 
Adamson v. Brockbank. 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (Utah 1947). 
In the Court's findings, in f 7, the Court indicated that Mr. Tibbs enlarged an existing ditch and 
" this ditch carried water to flood irrigate the approximately fifteen (15) acre Connally parcel..." 
Defendant believes there was no such evidence. The evidence at trial was that the ditch constructed by 
the Spencer family was never used and had never been able to carry water to the western parcel. 
There was further substantial evidence that at no time had the water in the pond been used for flood 
irrigation. 
As previously referenced, U 8 is inconsistent with the Courts previous finding that the dam was 
built in 1987. ^ 8 also fails to note that the easement for irrigation purposes was riot used between 
1995 and 1997 and was not used in 2002. The use, therefore, was sporadic. 
While the Court found that the ditches which ran through the Randall property were open, and 
obvious, the Court has not made any specific finding with regard to the use of the pond for the purpose 
of impounding, storing, and metering water for irrigation purposes. The Court must make specific 
findings regarding the easement not only in the ditches and canals, but also in the pond itself. 
7 
The Court also failed to make any findings with regard to perfected water rights issues, 
statutory easements and water rights, and whether the statutory enactments supercede the common law 
doctrine and the failure of White to hold a perfected water storage right under Utah water law. 
Paragraph 10 is inconsistent with the evidence introduced at trial, as White did not purchase his 
water rights until 1997. Paragraph 11 is inconsistent with the evidence and Court for the same reason, 
as White did not start irrigation 1995 because he did not have any water rights at that time. As 
previously indicated, the evidence of continuous, as to opposed to sporadic use is an element of this 
claim. Therefore, the provisions in %11 need to correctly cite the time when such irrigation water was 
run through the Randall Property. 
Paragraph 16 is expressly contrary to the decision of the Court rendered on the record 
following the trial. The Court in fact found that the White dog more probably than not killed the Randall 
horse, but that the defendant had been unable to establish value and therefore no damages were 
awarded. The Court did award the damages requested by Defendant for the value of his chickens 
which the Court found had been killed by the White dog. 
As previously mentioned, The Court has granted findings that not only grant an easement in an 
irrigation canal or ditch, but also that requires the Defendant to build a pond for the benefit of Plaintiffs 
easement. Therefore, the Court must make findings sufficient to support each element of the easement 
granted. No finding in this case support an award of an easement of Plaintiff in the pond on 
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Defendant's property, for the purpose of impounding and storing water. The Court should make such 
findings. In support thereof, Defendant provides the following: 
Utah law provides that the rights of the dominant owner of an easement are 
impliedly limited by the rights of the servient owner. Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 109 Utah 213, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah 1946). "The 
use of an easement must be as reasonable and as little burdensome to the 
servient estate as the nature of the easement and its purpose will permit." Id. 
(quoting Jenkins v. Depoyster, 299 Ky. 500, 186 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1945)). 
Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City. 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990) 
Therefore, the Court needs to make an express finding with regard to the most reasonable and 
least burdensome easement that is required under the circumstances. The plaintiff has claimed an 
easement by implication pursuant to the authority of Adamson V. Brockbank. 112 Utah 52 185 P.2b 
264 (Utah 1947), primarily on the basis that at the time that Randall purchased the property, the ditch 
running from the pond towards the White property was open, apparent, and obvious. This simple 
finding is not sufficient to establish an easement by implication and the Court needs to make express 
findings with regard to the following elements: 
(1) unity of title followed by severance; (2) at the time of severance the servitude was 
apparent, obvious, and visible; (3) the easement is reasonably necessary to enjoy the dominant estate; 
and (4) use of the easement was continuous rather than sporadic. See Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150, 
1152 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Potter v. Chadaz. 977 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah App. 1999). 
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LACK OF FINDINGS TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES: 
The findings, conclusion and judgment issued by the Court includes an award of attorney's fees 
to the Plaintiff. The Court has made no findings or conclusions supporting such an award. The Law in 
Utah is that attorney's fees are not recoverable absent a statute or contract which provides for them. 
"Utah adheres to the well-established rule that attorney fees generally cannot be recovered unless 
provided for by statute or by contract." Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 419 (Utah 
1989) (citing Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982). Attorney's fees 
must be allocated to the issues, both prevailed upon and not prevailed upon, a party seeking fees must 
allocate its fee request according to its underlying claims. Indeed, the party must categorize the time and 
fees expended for "(1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) 
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been 
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees." Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 
52, 55 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted) (quoting Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 
(Utah 1992)). In addition, "while a trial court may, in its discretion, deny fees altogether for failure to 
allocate, it may not award wholesale all attorney fees requested if they have not been allocated as to 
separate claims and/or parties." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998). 
In fact, the Utah Court of appeals favorably cited the Ross case for the proposition that 
attorney's fees cannot be awarded in an "easement by implication" case. In Ross v. Caglev, 65 Ore. 
10 
App. 79, 670 P.2d 190, 192 (Or. Ct. App. 1983), the Court held that party could not obtain attorney 
fees under contract provision since plaintiff was awarded an easement bv implication, and had "sought 
neither enforcement of the contract nor damages for its breach, but to have certain rights declared 
which had not been made part of the contract." Cited with approval, Chase v. Scott. 2001 UT App 
404. 
This Court must make express finding of any basis for an award of attorney's fees in connection 
with this case. The proposed findings do not state whether the claim is based on contract, statute, or 
some common law claim. Specific findings are necessary on this issue to support the judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 52, it is respectfully requested that the Court make specific 
findings on the issue of Easement by Implication, including necessity, continuity of use, and knowledge 
or imputed knowledge of the presence of the easement not just in the canals and ditches, but also in the 
pond for storage purposes. The Court needs to make specific findings of fact regarding White's right to 
store water on the Randall property particularly in light of the Smith Decree which adjudicates the rights 
of the waters of Thistle Creek from Indianola down Spanish Fork Canyon. 
This Court needs to make express findings on allowing and authorizing the Plaintiff to own and 
maintain a dam on Defendant's property for the purpose of impounding irrigation water without filing an 
application therefore with the State Engineer. 
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This Court must enter specific findings of fact which establish the volume of water the Plaintiff is 
entitled to impound, the period of time for which that water can be stored or retained, and the legal or 
statutory basis upon which that water storage is recognized. 
It is respectfully requested that the Court alter or amend the Findings to support the Court's 
prior decision, and further, that the Court supplement the Findings of Fact to support the various claims, 
causes of action, and remedies which have been proposed in the Conclusions of Law. 
DATED AND SIGNED this ^ Z ^ a y of September, 2004. 
JAMES G. CLARK 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I: 
^mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Alter, Amend, or Supplement Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, postage prepaid and addressed as follows; or 
hand-delivered to the following: or 
sent by facsimile to the following: 
REED L. MARTINEAU 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
PO BOX 45000 
S.L.CUT. 84145 
DATED AND SIGNED this 2 ? d a y of September, 2004. 
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Exhibit 6. 
Trial exhibit #8 aerial photograph of the dam failures of the 
upper and lower ponds during 1983 floods 
(Lower pond is stock watering pond on Randall property) 

Exhibit 7. 
Trial exhibits #4and 5 State of Utah Division of Water Rights data printout of 
Leon J and Eileen H. White water rights 
STATE OF UTAH - DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS - DATA PRINT OUT for a21263(51-6583) 
(WARNING: Water Rights makes NO claims as to the accuracy of this data.) RUN DATE: 09/03/2003 Page 1 
CHANGE: a21263 WATER RIGHT: 51-6583 CERT. NO.: AMENDATORY? No 
BASE WATER RIGHTS: 51-6583 
RIGHT EVIDENCED BY: 51-6583 U17724)(a portion of 51-224) 
CHANGES: Point of Diversion [ ], Place of Use [ 1, Nature of Use [X), Reservoir Storage [ 3-
NAME: White, Leon J. and Eileen H. 
ADDR: P.O. Box 309 
CITY: Fairview 
PHONE: - - EMAIL: 
NAME: White, Leon J. and Eileen H. 
ADDR: HC13 Box 4006 
CITY: Fairgiew 
PHONE: - - EMAIL: 
OWNER MISC: 
STATE: UT ZIP: 84629 
OWNER MISC: 
STATE: UT ZIP: 84629-9613 
DEFENDANTS EXHIBITl 
EXWWTNa £ _ 
CASENQ. <SQfcQQ302:| 
CLERK ^ 
FILING: 06/27/1997JRECVD BY: { ](PRIORITY: 06/27/1997|ADV DESIG: 06/27/1997jBY: [DGB 
PUB BEGAN: 07/16/1997 J PUB ENDED: 07/23/1997jPRTST END: 08/12/1997jPROTESTED: [No 
A/R DESIG: [Approved] j DESIG DATE: 08/14/1997 j REG ENG: [JER ] JAPPROP: [KLJ 
APPR/REJ: 08/15/1997jPROOF DUE: 08/31/2004JEXTENSION: JELEC/PROOF: [ 
CERT/WUC: (LAP, ETC: jPROV LETR: jRENOVATE: 
] jPAPER: Mt. Pleasant Py 
3|PROOF PUB: 08/12/1997|BY: [DD 3 
] | MEMO DEC: [No ] j APPR/REJECT: [Approved] 
]j ELEC/PROOF: j ROUGH DRAFT: 
JRECON REQ: JTYPE: [ ] 
Date Verified: 06/27/1997 Initials: DGB Status: Approved 
***************** ******************************************** 
***********************H E R E T O F O R E*********************** 
***************************************************************** ***************************************************************** 
**************************************************************** 
***********************H E R E A F T E R************************ 
(FLOW: 1.0 acre-feet IJFLOW: 1.0 acre-feet 
(SOURCE: Underground Water Well ||SOURCE: Underground Water Well 
|COUNTY: Sanpete J J COUNTY: Sanpete COM DESC: 0.5 miles West of Indianola 
J Actual irrigation is 0.1025 acres |j The purpose of this change application 
| j j is to convert the irrigation and a 
j || portion of the stockwatering to cover 
| || a trailer, which will be used as a 
| J| guest house . 
jPOINT(S) OF DIVERSION > JjSAME AS HERETOFORE 
jPoint Underground: || 
j(1) S 200 ft E 2200 ft from W4 cor, Sec 05, T 12S, R 4E, SLBM jj 
| Diameter: 6 ins. Depth: 100 to 500 ft. || 
J COMMENT: )J 
| PLACE OF USE > | ] SAME AS HERETOFORE 
| --NWX-- --NEX-- --SWX-- --SEX-- \\ 
| |N N S S| |N N S S|JN N S S| |N N S S| | j 
j jW E W E|jW E W E|jW E W E| |W E W E| j j 
|Sec 05 T 12S R 4E SLBM * : : : * * : : : * * :X: : * * : : : * | | 
|NATURE OF USE > J 1 CHANGED as follows: 
SUPPLEMENTAL to Other Water Rights: No SUPPLEMENTAL to Other Water Rights: No 
Change#: a21263 cont.** (WARNING: Water Rights makes NO claims as to the accuracy of this data.) RUN DATE: 09/03/2003 Page 2 
0.1000 acs Sol/Sup: 
i 
jSTK: 5 Cattle or Equivalent 
acs USED 04/01 - 10/31 |j 
I I . 
I I . USED 01/01 - 12/3l||STK: 3 Cattle or Equivalent USED 01/01 - 12/31 
II-
I 
lDOM: 1 Family USED 01/01 - 12/31||DOM: 2 Families USED 01/01 - 12/31 
EXTENSIONS OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO FILE PROOF*************************************************************************************** 
FILING: 01/05/1998|ADV DESIG: 
PROTST END: jPROTESTED: [ 
REGION ENG:[JER ] JAPPROP: [ 
|BY: [ ] | PUB BEGAN: | PUB ENDED: {PAPER: 
] JPROOF PUB: |BY: [ ]|A/R DESIG: [Approved] j DESIG DATE: 01/08/1998 
]|MEMO DEC: lYes] j APPR/REJECT [Approved] |APPR/RE J: 02/23/1998jPROOF DUE: 01/31/2003 
FILING: 01/29/2003|ADV DESIG: 
PROTST END: jPROTESTED: [No 
REGION ENG:[MHANDY ]|APPROP: [ 
|BY: [ ] | PUB BEGAN: |PUB ENDED: | PAPER: 
]jPROOF PUB: |BY: [ JJA/R DESIG: [Approved]jDESIG DATE: 02/20/2003 
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